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premise underlying all law-common, statutory, regulatory; oral
and written-not just constitutional law. Thus, the great lengths
to which Harris goes to explore the possibility that a nation can
be bound with words is reminiscent of angels and the pin.
At the same time, Harris is not touched by a tension that I
believe legal theorists do feel some concern for: the belief that, at
the end of the day, there remains a need for a constitution to
have some effect as law. That is, a theory must aspire ultimately
to bear in some way on the resolution of real questions that arise
in actual cases. Although Harris recognizes that "[t]he constitutional order is not just a construction for the mind, like a work of
fiction or poetry, or even, somewhat less emphatically, a work of
political philosophy," he nevertheless does not consider any part
of his abstract undertaking to include even the aspiration to an
answer of any constitutional question. He avows that, for him,
interpretation is "a way of looking at the political world." Sheepishly, I must confess that such an approach to the project of interpretation leaves me ultimately unsatisfied.

THE MORAL TRADffiON OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETA·
TION. H. Jefferson Powell.! Durham: Duke University
Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 296. $39.00.
Jim Chenz
Just as the Gospel reminds Christians that "the last shall be
first,"3 the observation that "less is more:' surely does not damn
H. Jefferson Powell's most recent work with faint praise. In The
Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism: A Theological
Interpretation, Powell launches an unapologetically Christian attack on America's long-standing civic faith in constitutional law.
Powell's core message-that there is no such thing as a Christian
approach to constitutionalism-heralds a radical and powerful
new model for understanding the relationship between personal
Christianity and public law.
1. Professor of Law and Divinity, Duke University.
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I thank Mark Mousesian
for his helpful comments.
3. Matthew 19:30, 20:16; Mark 10:31; Luke 13:30 (King James).
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The Moral Tradition enriches a growing jurisprudence not
ashamed to call itself Christian Legal Studies.4 As the Biblical
basis for his project, Powell chooses the familiar distinction between Caesar and God.s This concept, so often stressed in legal
writing about religion and in religious writing about law, might
be considered intellectually banal if it were not so thoroughly
and frequently ignored in practice. Powell omits any direct discussion of social and legal issues popularly thought to be of special interest to Christians. Even when discussing substantive due
process rights to contraception and abortion,6 he never purports
to prescribe a proper Christian view on the merits, a moralistic
exercise in which even Supreme Court Justices sometimes indulge.' Powell alludes exactly once to the agenda of the so-called
"religious right," and in rather unflattering terms at that: "The
heedless subservience of much of American fundamentalist
Christianity to nineteenth-century secular ideology demonstrates
the inevitable result of attempting to think theologically in an
intellectual vacuum."s His refusal to conscript God in discrete
legal and political battles starkly contradicts both the secular
state's claim that God "has favored our undertakings"9 and religious groups' increasingly common efforts to translate abstract
spiritual authority into tangible political power. The omission is
conspicuous, perhaps deliberate. Powell seems to perceive a far
graver threat than the law's episodic failure to conform to individual Christians' political preferences.
Powell's essential message is straightforward and striking, a
combination of Shaker simplicity with distinctly un-Quaker aggression. Powell ruthlessly honors his commitment to a "theological" analysis of American constitutionalism based on "those
aspects of Christian thought and action that are often separated
4. Cf. 2 Tunothy 2:15 ("Study to show thyself approved unto God, a workman that
needeth not to be ashamed, rightly divining the word of truth."); 1 Peter 4:16 ("Yet if any
man suffer as a Christian, let him not be ashamed; but let him glorify God on this
behalf.").
5. Pp. 8 n.20, 11, 292; cf. Matthew 22:21 ("Render therefore unto Caesar the things
which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's"); Mark 12:17; Luke 20:25.
6. Pp. 173-81.
7. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing that "[c]ondemnation of [homosexual conduct] is firmly rooted in JudeaoChristian moral and ethical standards"); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (concluding that the Congress of "a Christian nation" could scarcely
have intended to restrict churches' ability to hire foreign clerics).
8. P. 266. But cf. p. 260 n.6 ("[I)t is not the assumption or conclusion of this book
that political activity undertaken in this polity in the name of Christ necessarily is theolog.
.
ically or ethically mistaken.").
9. The slogan Annuit ctEptis appears on the Great Seal of the Umted States, wh1ch
is depicted on the reverse of the dollar bill.
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out as moral or ethical."to He doggedly poses an unfiltered version of "the faith question" to fellow Christians:n in whom do
you place your faith, Caesar or God? For a Christian, the question necessarily answers itself. Powell's elaboration of the answer severely undercuts conventional efforts to reconcile secular
lawyering with Christianity. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment
did not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, the resurrection of Christ does not command agreement with Judge John
Noonan's Persons and Masks of the Law.12 Forswearing any attempt to reconcile "the relation of love to power" within "the
legal enterprise,"t3 Powell conducts a grinding assault on "[t]he
temptation to ascribe theological value to the institutions and
modes of thought of American constitutionalism."t4
After declaring his disdain for "any unquestioning theological approval" of the constitutional status quo,ts Powell mercilessly demonizes American constitutionalism. Although this
tactic is less than sporting, it does help Powell focus his powers of
demolition. Under Sanford Levinson's quasi-Christian taxonomy, Powell is a "catholic" in his willingness to look outside
"scriptural" text as a source of doctrine, but an institutional
"protestant" in his distrust of centralized, hierarchical interpretive authority.16 By contrast, the American constitutional establishment emerges as the opposite over the course of Powell's
narrative: constitutionalism develops a "protestant" obsession
over texts while concentrating all power of moral pronouncements within the "catholic" institution of the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, this transparent dichotomy between Powell's own
catholic-protestant virtue and the Supreme Court's protestantcatholic vice drains much of the suspense from The Moral Tradition. Unlike John Milton, whose dazzling, eloquent portrayal of
Lucifer shed some doubt on the poet's stated quest to "justify the
10. P. 8 n.20.
11. Cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 837
(1990) (describing the technique of "asking the woman question" as the first method by
which feminists "do law").
12. John T. Noonan, Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law (Farrar, Straus & Giroux,
1976).
13. Id. at xii.
14. P. 8.
15. P. 8.
16. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 27-53 (Princeton U. Press, 1988).
Despite his willingness to consult extratextual sources of authority, Powell has stressed
the importance of constitutional text. See H. Jefferson Powell, Parchment Matters: A
Meditation on the Constitution as Text, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1427 (1986).

602

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 11:599

ways of God to men,"t7 Powell relentlessly aims to expose the
mocking imitation of divine order through secular law.
Powell's central proposition springs from an imaginative
modification of Alasdair Macintyre's catastrophe thesis, which
posits that a rationalistic, individualistic society can never reach
moral agreement.ts Ironically, Powell notes, the "Enlightenment's parallel attempts to control irrational and violent action
through the institution of the nation-state, and to replace irrational, tradition-dependent moralities with universal norms of
reason" gave rise to an American constitutionalism that developed a moral tradition of its own.19 Powell's description is
neither novel nor problematic. The numerous grand theories in
American law routinely justify themselves morally by claiming
rational coherence. Indeed, many a grand theory invokes determinacy as such as its exclusive moral justification.2o Moreover,
legal scholars routinely study constitutional law as America's
civic religion, complete with a sacred text, an ecclesiastical hierarchy, a chronically alienated laity, and occasional holy wars.21
Instead, treating American constitutional law as a moral tradition has far more important prescriptive implications for Powell's
project. If "Christian theology and American constitutionalism
share the intellectual and social structure [that are] characteristic
of moral traditions," they become "in a significant sense rivals or
competitors" for believers seeking a "rational exploration of the
nature of human community and of the good life. "22
In short, Powell is arguing that American constitutionalism
has aspired to provide a moral tradition akin to Christianity's. If
so, the American constitutional system has committed nothing
less than what C.S. Lewis has called "the essential vice, the utmost evil": pride.23 Proud Lucifer aspired to a "throne above the
stars of God,"24 and proud Eve swallowed the serpent's deceitful
17. John Milton, Paradise Lost, Book I, I. 25 (1667).
18. See Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 6-8, 36-50, 25354 (U. of Notre Dame Press, 2d ed. 1984); Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? 335 (U. of Notre Dame Press, 1988).
19. P. 14.
20. See, e.g., Antonio Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1175 (1989). The title speaks for itself.
21. See, e.g., Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, eds., American Civil Religion
(1974); Levinson, Constitutional Faith (cited in note 16); Thomas Grey, The Constitution
as Scripture, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1984); George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of
Antonin Scalia, 99 Yale L.J. 1297 (1990); Symposium, Religious Dimensions of American
Constitutionalism, 39 Emory L.J. 1 (1990).
22. P. 14.
23. C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity 94 (Macmillan, 1943).
24. Isaiah 14:13.
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promise that she and Adam could become "as gods, knowing
good and evil."25 Just as J.R.R. Tolkien's evil Sauron molded
grotesque orcs in a futile effort to imitate (or mock) God's creation,26 the American constitutionalism that Powell depicts has
generated a tradition of false, treacherous claims to moral cogency. The sin also implicates those who are complicit in wielding the Constitution's moral apparatus, for "[t]hose who put their
faith in worldly order I . . . I Degrade what they exalt. "27
The strength of this analogy ameliorates The Moral Tradition's largely perfunctory recitation of the familiar doctrinal progression from Calder v. Bull to Roe v. Wade. Powell's historical
survey nevertheless displays momentary flashes of brilliance. For
instance, Powell convincingly illustrates how liberal rationalism
subverted the traditional common law's "nonliberal, pre-Enlightenment, tradition-dependent form of rational argument about
justice. "zs Common law as practiced by Cook, Selden, and Hale
relied less on a hidebound system of Euclidean logic than on the
fluid concept of resoun. By treating resoun as "that which is reasonable,"29 "that which is just, fair, moral,"3o or even "a believable story, an acceptable narrative,"31 common lawyers in the
early eighteenth century were employing techniques that twentieth-century jurisprudes often claim to have discovered anew.3z
Powell largely blames Blackstone for the loss of the common
law heritage. "[L]iterary felicity" and "relative compactness"
helped the Commentaries sweep across book-starved America,
but they also injected Enlightenment-inspired "analytical 'philosophy' " into the common law at the time of the Constitution's
framing.33 Thus began liberalism's gradual capture of a common
law based on "a process of reasoning that was disciplined without
being determinate in a quasi-geometrical fashion."34 But for
Blackstone, American law might have retained the insight that
conscious logic is only "the most superficial part" of human
25. Genesis 3:5.
26. J.R.R. Tolkien, The Two Towers 89 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 2d ed. 1965); see also
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Return of the King 409-10 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 2d ed. 1965) (stating the origins of "orcdom").
27. T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral 30 (Faber, 1935).
28. P. 76.
29. Cf., e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (Little, Brown, 1960);
George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949 (1985).
30. E.g., Lloyd Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (Harv. U. Press, 1987).
31. E.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 971 (1991).
32. P. 78.
33. P. 82 (quoting Thomas Green, Introduction, in 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 5 (U. of Chi. Press, 1979)).
34. P. 86.
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thought.Js In Powell's eyes, therefore, the boast that the "original and enduring American" model of law "sprang not from the
philosophy of Nietzsche but from the jurisprudence of Blackstone" has far more rhetorical panache than historical accuracy.36
Powell might have more clearly distinguished between the
institutional and the substantive dimensions of constitutionalism
as a moral tradition. Powell skillfully documents how the antebellum legal elite denigrated and eventually suppressed Congress, the President, and even the legal academy as rivals in the
Supreme Court's quest for exclusive authority to expound constitutional morality.J7 He is noticeably less successful in communicating how the judiciary has reoriented the Constitution's "moral
compass" over time without abandoning the project of establishing an autonomous civil morality. In other words, although the
Supreme Court secured institutional supremacy in constitutional
interpretation at a relatively early stage, incorrigible political vicissitudes have constantly buffeted the substantive content of the
Court's legal morality. But these moral shifts have never diminished the timbre of the Court's voice when it purports to speak ex
cathedra. Powell never explicitly articulates this key point, leaving his reader to intuit the content of constitutional morality
from a compact historical survey of the slavery-induced constitutional crisis, the brief rise and complete collapse of Radicalism,
Lochnerism and the countervailing "modem theory," and contemporary doctrine of substantive due process. This flaw is especially crippling because the vernacular meaning of "morality"
implies the existence of a fixed "moral anchor."Js A "moral tradition" in Powell's sense, however, is necessarily dynamic, "constituted by an ongoing argument in which its fundamental
35. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 354, in RJ. Hollingdale ed. and trans., A
Nietzsche Reader 66 (Harmondsworth, 1977); cf. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 528 (1945) (quoting Alfred North Whitehead for the
insight that "[c]ivilization advances by extending the number of important operations
which we can perform without thinking").
36. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. a. 2510, 2523 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
37. Pp. 111-17; see also H. Jefferson Powell, Book Review, Enslaved to Judicial
Supremacy?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1198-1204 (1993). Contra Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. LJ.
(forthcoming 1994) (arguing that the President has the right-indeed, the obligation-to
nullify judgments contrary to transcendently correct law); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 81 (1993) (same).
38. See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 771 (Merriam-Webster,
1989) ("moral implies conformity to established sanctioned codes or accepted notions of
right and wrong" (emphasis added)).
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agreements are expressed, defined, and revised."39 So significant
a conceit deserves far clearer explanation.
Powell's real strength lies in his ability to expose the rhetorical poise and political duplicity with which the Court adopts new
moral paradigms. The Court may have momentarily prevented
its revolution against Lochner v. New York from inflicting collateral damage on "discrete and insular minorities,"40 but the selfdealing nature of constitutional morality quickly resurfaced in
the Court's modem substantive due process decisions. In a novel
twist on the Supreme Court's decisions involving contraception
and abortion, Powell argues that Griswold v. Connecticut could
be defended as a thoroughly traditional common law effort to
nudge the fuzzy boundaries of vague constitutional "penumbras,
formed by emanations" from specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights.4t To Powell, American constitutionalism's most recent
intellectual crisis began a full year before Roe v. Wade, when the
invalidation of a statute criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird4z completed
the Enlightenment's conquest of the Constitution's vulnerable
morality. Having abandoned the project of incorporating "the
disadvantaged into an enriched political community itself constituted in part by other communities (religious, familial, and so
on)" through the admittedly "statist and 'rights' oriented" ideology of United States v. Carolene Products,43 the Court in Eisenstadt "denied the legitimacy of any moral content to American
political organization beyond the protection of the atomistic individual against intrusion. "44
This is an oft-told tale, and to hear Powell retell it does have
occasional rewards. Powell, however, is by no means the first
scholar to note how modem jurisprudence has deified the law in
an effort to fill the spiritual vacuum left by the Enlightenment.
Harold Berman, for example, has identified three distinct strands
of legal deification: positivists "deify the state," naturalists "deify
39. P. 24; cf. Macintyre, After Virtue at 222 (cited in note 18) (noting that traditions
"decay, disintegrate and disappear" when internal rational mechanisms fail or when they
become corrupted by external influences).
40. United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); cf. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[e]ven the more
specific" provisions of the Constitution "are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other").
42. 405 u.s. 438 (1972).
43. United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
44. P. 177.
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the mind," and historicists "deify the people, the nation."45 Powell's contribution is a ruthless expose of the Supreme Court's attempt to deify itself, the liberal jurisprudence that it inherited
from the Enlightenment, and the civil order embodied in the
Constitution.46 Thus, in light of the Court's claim that its "obligation is to define the liberty of all," the concomitant protest that
the Court does not "mandate [its] own moral code" is patently
fraudulent. 47 Within a constitutional catechism on abortion in
which "liberty" is quite literally the first and the last word,4B the
Justices plainly view themselves as Alpha and Omega within the
civic covenant that binds succeeding generations of Americans to
the framers of the Constitution. 49
Powell hits his stride in a methodical refutation of traditional
scholars' efforts to "modify or reject the [constitutional] tradition's long-standing claim to autonomy ... and instead explicitly
identify constitutionalism as a form" of "philosophy, morality, or
extralegal politics. "5o John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcing
theory of judicial review5t cannot liberate judges from the responsibility of making "substantive political and moral
choices."52 Bruce Ackerman's apology for morally desirable judicial decisions53 rests on the implausible "political myth" of "a
People that acts in identifiable ways and speaks in comprehensible tones. "54 A similarly hapless struggle to identify a national
community swamps the neo-republican theories of Cass Sun45. Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 779, 783 (1988).
46. Cf. Powell, Parchment Matters (cited in note 16).
47. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
48. Id.at 2803 ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."), 2833 ("We
invoke (the Court's obligation] once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise of liberty."); see also id.at 2807 (arguing that "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education" merit the Fourteenth Amendment's full protection of the
liberty interest in "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life").
49. Compare Revelation 1:8,21:6,22:13 with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2833.
50. P. 184.
51. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harv. U. Press, 1980); see also John
Hart Ely, The WDges of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920
(1973).
52. P. 189.
53. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 1991);
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale LJ. 453 (1989); Bruce Ackerman,
Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013 (1984).
54. Pp. 201, 200.
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steinss and Frank Michelman.s6 Powell reaches peak critical
form when he snags Mark Thshnets7 and Robert Borkss in the
same intellectual web. Both Thshnet and Bork "want to reject
liberal individualism and to recognize the role of the community
in forming morality," but both eventually concede that no such
community exists.s9 As Powell concludes, "[t]hat a leading socialist CLS professor and a 'conservative' Republican judge have
so much in common at the most fundamental intellectual level
tells us something very important about American constitutionalism. "60 Powell's effective application of the "trashing" technique
echoes Tushnet's own exasperated conclusion about American
constitutional thinking: "Critique is all there is. "61
If Powell is amused at the failure of religiously neutral efforts to rationalize American constitutionalism, he becomes completely agitated when he examines "the assimilation of Christian
social thought and action to the supposed constraints of political
realism."62 Just as Robert Bork warned against the political seduction of the law, Powell denounces the tempting of Christendom, the legal seduction of theology. Powell accordingly
reserves his most virulent venom for "Constantinian" Christian
scholars who "see in the American political system a precursor or
embodiment of the kingdom of God."63 Mild Constantinians
such as John Neuhaus and John Noonan commit the "doublebarrel error" of "simultaneously accepting as normative the coercive nature of the state while overstating egregiously the significance of having individual Christians exercise the state's
power."64 The archetypical Constantinian, Michael Perry, "effectively collapses Christian ethics into contemporary constitution55. See Cass Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (1990); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 Yale L. Rev. 1539 (1988).
56. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank
Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986).
57. See Mark V. Thshnet, Red, White and Blue:A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Law (Harv. U. Press, 1988).
58. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law (The Free Press, 1990).
59. P. 254.
60. P. 254.
61. Thshnet, Red, White and Blue at 318 (cited in note 56); cf. Arthur Allen Leff,
Law and, 87 Yale L.J. 989, 1011 (1978) ("[A]II we can-understand, and that not very well,
are the games we ourselves generate and eventually, but predictably, lose.").
62. P. 260.
63. P. 261. Powell borrows the term "Constantinian" from John Howard Yoder, The
Priestly Kingdom· Social Ethics as Gospel135-47 (U. of Notre Dame Press, 1984), and
Stanley Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today 180-84 (Labyrinth Press, 1988).
64. P. 276 (criticizing John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square (W.B. Eerdmans,
1984), and Noonan, Persons and Masks of the Law (cited in note 12)).
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alism" and thereby undermines the church's ability "to engage in
authentic Christian social criticism. "6s
Once Powell finishes administering an acid bath to theological apologies for the American constitutional order, a remarkable coincidence emerges. Constantinian jurisprudence is the
Blackstonian beast reborn and swaddled in the vestments of illusory priestly virtue. All of the competing jurisprudential models
depicted in The Moral Tradition-conventional constitutionalism, the Constantinian variation, and Powell's Augustinian alternative-view majoritarian politics as prone to violence. All
three schools treat the political system as the product of the Fall,
of the original sin that permeates all elected officials as they
"pass[ ] from the stink of the didie to the stench of the shroud. "66
As a cure, Blackstone prescribed principled, rational judicial reasoning.67 The defenders of the social morality that is American
constitutionalism have done no more than debate the principles.
Constantinian jurisprudence merely substitutes Christian ethics
as practiced by virtuous judges for the liberal rationalism practiced by Blackstone's principled judges. Ultimately, both schools
place their hope for redemption in the legal process. Confounded by the brutality of majoritarian politics, both Blackstonian and Constantinian jurists respond, "I know that my
Redeemer adjudicates. "68
As an alternative to the Constantinians' Panglossian piety,
Powell offers what he calls the Augustinian justification for democracy and judicial review. St. Augustine's jurisprudence denied that the moral value of a law had any necessary connection
to the personal virtue of the secular lawmaker. Accordingly, "a
good law can be enacted by a lawgiver who is not good," for such
a "law is not evil just because it was made by an unjust and corrupt lawmaker."69 Conversely, even virtuous "laws enacted for
the government of cities" and nations may "make many concessions and leave unpunished many crimes which are nevertheless
punished by Divine Providence. "7o For St. Augustine, the temporal glory of the Roman Empire-measured by "ample terri65. Pp. 276-77; see also pp. 208-24 (criticizing Michael J. Perry, The Constitution,
The Courts, and Human Rights (Yale Univ. Press, 1982), and Michael J. Perry, Morality,
Politics, and Law (Oxford U. Press, 1988)).
66. See, e.g., Robert Penn Warren, All the King's Men 49 (Harcourt, Brace, 1946;
rpt. 1982).
67. See generally 1 Blackstone at ••63-92 (cited in note 32).
68. Cf. Job 19:25.
69. St. Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will, in 59 The Fathers of the Church 63,82
(Robert P. Russell trans. 1968).
70. Id.at 83.
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tory and long duration"-did not vindicate the pagan religion of
the early Caesars.11 In Powell's modern city of God, democracy
tempers the inherent violence of the secular state by reminding
its leaders of the ephemeral nature of their power and by corroding the law's unattainable claim to transcendent truth. The influence of Critical Legal Studies is undeniable: Powell assumes that
law embodies and inevitably enforces the political preferences of
a privileged class, that law denies its own contingency, and that
the law's claim to formal, discoverable coherence is noxiously
fraudulent. Attempting to infuse theological rigor cannot cure
the law's organic indeterminacy. In attempting to Christianize
the secular state, Emperor Constantine's twentieth-century intellectual heirs have merely enabled the state to confiscate the rhetoric and moral authority of the church.
Ultimately, Powell's positive case-what he affirmatively exhorts Christian lawyers to do-consists of only a few, very modest propositions, all stated at a high level of abstraction. He
starts from the initial premise that Christian theology provides
"no general principle ... for deciding in the abstract the proper
balance between majoritarian and judicial decision making."n
He nevertheless recognizes the need for some standard by which
Christians can weigh the relative merits of judicial deference and
of judicial activism. In rejecting the argument that insulation
from political passions warrants a preference for adjudication
over legislation, Powell makes a stark sociological observation
worthy of Mark Thshnet: "Judges, and especially federal judges,
belong overwhelmingly to an educated upper-middle class not
notable for its responsiveness to Christian commitments. "73 Instead, the nominal possibility that the electoral process can reverse legislative decisions generally counsels judicial deference to
legislative policy judgments. This scrap of humility has the Au71. 1St. Augustine, The City of God 142 {Hafner Publishing, Marcus Dods trans. &
ed. 1948).

72. P. W.
73. P. 288; see alsop. 288 n.l13 (noting that "the education and professionalization
of most judges ... privatiz(e] whatever religious beliefs they hold and shap[e] their judicial behavior to conform to the deeply secularized and intensely individualistic values of
their social class"); cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief How American Law
and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 1-11, 23-24 (Basic Books, 1993) (noting widespread hostility to religion in most intellectual circles); Sanford Levinson, Book Review,
Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 2061, 2062 (1992) (noting
the relative lack of attention to "claims of exclusion and silencing made by those with
strong religious commitments"); David M. Smolin, Book Review, Regulating Religious
and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 Iowa L.
Rev. 1067, 1067-68 (1992) ("demand(ing]" that "academic and legal elites cease their repression" of "Christian traditionalists").
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gustinian virtue of reminding the state's agents that their power
is evanescent, that secular law can never pronounce transcendent
truth. Out of a vast sea of possibilities suggested by the courts
and the commentators, Powell extracts three exceptions to his
general rule of judicial deference: protection of racial, religious,
and other minorities under a Carolene Products rationale; a process-sensitive patrol against the suppression of free expression;
and enforcement of the procedural due process ideals of reliability and regularity.74 "There is no Christian constitutionalism,"
Powell concludes; "Caesar remains Caesar."75
Ironically, for someone who has rejected a Christian theory
of Critical Legal Studies as a "nightmare" that would
subordinate faith, hope, and love to " 'fuller forms of self-assertion and attachment,"76 Powell has outlined a CLS approach to
Christian Legal Studies. Powell finds no aspect of law more theologically pernicious than its "language of permanence, of settled
decision, of absolute political value. "77 To lend the language of
divine immanence to the law is to confer the attributes of God on
law. What Duncan Kennedy condemns as reification of the
law,1s Powell decries as deification of the law. According to Powell's theology, there may be no greater jurisprudential offense
than this blasphemous transformation of the Gospel of John: "In
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with the Law,
and the Word was Law."79 The Supreme Court's acceptance of
constitutionalism as the American social morality erects legal altars "to [an] unknown god," in defiance of the Christian precept
that the "lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made
with hands."so Constantinian jurisprudence, Powell argues persuasively, can no more nullify the law's idolatry than the hands of
Israel can shape a graven image pleasing to God.st Arguably, a
consciously Christianized constitutionalism might be even worse
74. Pp. 289-91.
75. P. 292.
76. H. Jefferson Powell, The Gospel According to Roberto: A Theological Polemic,
1988 Duke L.J. 1013, 1026 (quoting Roberto Unger, False Necessity and Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy 575 (Cambridge U. Press, 1987)).
77. P. 289.
78. Cf., e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on
the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 939 (1985).
79. See John 1:1; cf. Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia at 1320
(cited in note 21) (describing this formula as "the short and simple recipe for a catechetical Constitution").
80. Acts 17:23-24.
81. Cf. Exodus 32 (describing Aaron's creation of the golden calf); Steven D. Smith,
Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Va. L. Rev. 583, 610-13 (1993) (using the biblical account to illustrate the allure of idolatry in law).
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than the purely secular variety. The historical Caesar that Powell
vilifies is, after all, Constantine the pious princeps, not Diocletian
the maker of martyrs.
Like many of its counterparts in the secular CLS movement,
Powell's theological theory is far more effective as a weapon of
destructive description than as a tool of constructive prescription.82 Powell has concocted a legal theory so corrosive that it
virtually consumes itself. The Moral Tradition dissolves even its
own limited case for Christian judicial activism. In endorsing
Carolene Products' model of judicial review, Powell overlooks
the well-established tendency of discrete and insular minorities
to convert judicial shelter into political advantage.s3 Powell also
understates the politicized nature of the judicial process itself.84
At its extreme, his reductionist theory erases any possibility for
stating a theologically sound Christian agenda within the legal
process. Total human depravity infects the courtroom and the
campaign trail equally. The cure lies not in the "works of righteousness which we have done," but in the mercy and irresistible
grace of God.ss From this perspective, Christian lawyering consists simply of seeking justice, loving mercy, and walking humbly
with God.86
Whatever its flaws, Powell's critique of constitutionalism
does follow sound theological instincts. He reminds the other
leading figures of Christian Legal Studies of the dangers of apologizing too readily for the law. When asked whether the Roman
state should crucify the presumed King of the Jews, the chief
priests of God's chosen people responded, "We have no king but
Caesar."s7 Even in its silence, The Moral Tradition may also
have a message for Christians in the legal laity. Perhaps unintentionally, Powell's repeated invocations of the compassion embod82. Cf. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17
Law & Soc. Inquiry 779 (1992).
83. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & PhilipP. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Criti·
cal Introduction 12-37 (U. Chi. Press, 1991); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Prod·
ucts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985); Geoffrey Miller, The True Story ofCarolene Products,
1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 397.
84. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Coun, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802,
814-23 (1982); Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale
L.J. 1219, 1229-33 (1994); cf. Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial
Power, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 281, 293-302 (1994) (arguing that self-dealing political behavior
also infects judicial staff).
85. See Titus 3:5-7.
86. See Micah 6:8.
87. John 19:15. But cf. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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ied in the Beatitudesss and the Great Cmnmandmentss9 deliver a
timely message to a Christian community prone to fall into the
trap of placing "sins of the flesh" at "the centre of Christian morality," prone to forget that "a cold, self-righteous prig who regularly goes to church may be far nearer to hell than a prostitute. "90
Even if short on specifics, Powell's tract may inspire theological
introspection in an age when religious social activism too often
suggests that Christianity has no relevance after birth and before
death.
The historical schism between Western and Eastern Christianity provides one final gauge by which to judge The Moral Tradition. Whereas the Western church has traditionally aspired to
become the state, the Eastern church has sought to transform the
state into the church.91 Having endorsed Macintyre's catastrophe thesis, Powell expends minimal energy in implicitly dismissing the "Western" sort of social activism most often
associated with contemporary political campaigns overtly seeking
the support of Christian voters. In distinct but equally inimical
ways, both secular constitutionalists and Constantinian jurisprudes have been working toward an "Eastern" transfiguration
of the positive state into the church. Exalting America's liberal
social morality effectively treats the constitutional state as a substitute for the church, a secular competitor for ecclesiastical authority. Likewise, Constantinian jurisprudence seeks to redeem
the state by making it a vassal of the church, a novice to be
taught the church's more virtuous morality. According to Powell, neither response warrants Christian support. Worldly power
was one of the temptations that Satan offered Christ.92 Christ
declined, instead founding a countervailing kingdom that is explicitly "not of this world. "93
The Roman Empire's implementation of Western law on
Eastern soil provided the historical context in which Christianity
itself emerged. Ever the historian, Powell argues that the relationship between Caesar and God has scarcely changed since
Christ's first sojourn on earth. The Moral Tradition shows how
88. See Matthew 5:3-7:27; Luke 6:20-49.
89. See Matthew 22:36-40; Mark 12:29-34; Luke 11:25-28.
90. Lewis, Mere Christianity at 80 (cited in note 23); see also John 8:7.
91. See Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers KaramDr.ov 66 (Constance Garnett Heinemann, trans. 1968) (" '[T)he Church is not to be transformed into the State. That is
Rome and its dream .... On the contrary, the State is transformed into the Church, will
ascend and become a Church over the whole world-which is . . . only the glorious
destiny ordained for the Orthodox Church. This star will arise in the east!'").
92. See Matthew 4:8-10; Luke 4:5-8.
93. John 18:36.

1994-95)

BOOK REVIEW

613

American constitutionalism has elaborated the realizable rules
and formal rationality of Roman laW94 into a full-blown, self-contained system of social morality. In America as in Rome, the
legal apparatus of the secular state continues to ask, "What is
truth?"9s Powell's accomplishment is a powerful demonstration
that neither twenty centuries of legal evolution nor twenty decades of American constitutionalism bring Caesar any closer to
answering this question on his own.

BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS. By Carol M. Swain.I Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 275.
Daniel A. Farbetl

For the past twenty years, the federal courts have been vigorously engaged in racial redistricting. Recently, this involvement was attacked by the only black member of the current
Court. In his concurring opinion in Holder v. Hal/,3 Justice
Thomas challenged the conceptual basis for race-based reapportionment. A contrary view, represented by writers such as Lani
Guinier, is that current judicial efforts do not go nearly far
enough. This viewpoint is exemplified by Randall Kennedy's
harsh review of Black Faces, Black Interests in Reconstruction.4
Notably, this debate about redistricting is not merely taking place
between blacks and whites but also among blacks themselvesKennedy, Guinier, and Swain are all African American.
Unlike many other contributions to this debate, the Swain
book is richly empirical. Besides the multiple-regression analyses that are the staple of modem social science, Professor Swain
presents the results of several years of patient interviews with
94. See generally Rudolph von ]bering, Der Geist Des Romischen Rechts § 4, at 5055 (1883).
95. John 18:38.
1. Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University.
2. Associate Dean of Faculty and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota. Although I haven't burdened this review with citations to their work, my
knowledge of this area is based largely on the work of Kathryn Abrams, Phil Frickey,
Lani Guinier, and Sam lssacharoff.
3. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
4. Randall Kennedy, Blacks in Congress: Carol Swain's Critique, 2:2 Reconstruction 34 (1993).

